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Summary
Frege seems committed to the thesis that the senses of the funda-
mental notions of arithmetic remain stable and are stably grasped
by thinkers throughout history. Fully competent practitioners grasp
those senses clearly and distinctly, while uncertain practitioners see
them, the very same senses, “as if through amist”. There is thus a com-
mon object of the understanding apprehended to a greater or lesser
degree by thinkers of diverging conceptual competence. Frege takes
the thesis to be a condition for the possibility of the rational intelli-
gibility of mathematical practice. I argue however that the idea that
senses could be grasped as a matter of degree is in tension with the
constitutive theses that Frege held with regard to sense. Given those
theses, there can in fact be no such thing asmisty grasp of sense, since
any uncertainty as to the logical features of a given sense will entail
that one is getting hold of a different sense or of no sense at all. I con-
sider various ways of resolving the tension and conclude that Frege’s
thesis cannot be defended if we take it to be a thesis about our compe-
tence with concepts. This leaves unresolved what I call the problem
of normative guidance, that is, the problem of explaining how the
fundamental notions of logic and arithmetic can provide inferential
guidance to thinkers.
keywords: frege, sense, incomplete understanding, norma-
tivity, logicism
Introduction
In the introduction toGrundlagen, Frege considers twoways of think-
ing of conceptual history. We could think of conceptual history, he
tells us, either as the history of our knowledge of concepts (of our
attempts to fully grasp their content) or as the history of our knowl-
edge of the meaning of concept-words instead.1 A third reading is
ruled out, the reading that would commit us to the doctrine that it
is the concepts themselves, and not the degree of clarity with which
we grasp their content, that change throughout history. Frege denies
that possibility on normative grounds. If what we aim at in our intel-
lectual efforts were in a state of “continual flux”, the very possibility of
knowledge would be “plunged into confusion”—no norm-governed
truth-oriented discourse could come into being. Significantly, later
in Grundlagen Frege uses the same turn of phrase (in Verwirrung
stürzen) to describe the consequences of any attempt to reject the laws
of logic (§14).
According to Frege, then, abandoning the idea that concepts re-
main stable targets of investigation throughout history would repre-
sent as much of a threat to rational thought as the attempt to suspend
the normative grip of the laws of logic on us. Or rather: it would be
just as unthinkable. In his view what can change is only the clarity
with which we grasp those stable concepts. Until we succeed in ex-
tracting them from the “extraneous integuments” that obscure their
purity, concepts are apprehended “as if through a mist”, Frege con-
cludes.2
Call the thesis that concepts and the meaning of concept-words re-
main stable throughout history stability.3 I think it is not mere
happenstance that while Frege repeatedly warned us against the re-
lated perils of abandoning stability and the laws of logic, he had
no positive account to offer either for the epistemology of those laws
or for the phenomenology of “misty” understanding—his remarks on
both issues are equally tentative and inconclusive. In my view, Frege’s
caution was engendered by his realisation that the only defence of
stability and of the privileged epistemic standing of the basic laws
that would not violate his anti-psychologism would have to rely on
the notions of sense and sense-grasp, notions for which he could not
however provide a fully satisfying characterisation.
In this paper, I limit myself to considering the question of whether
1Frege (1884, vii). See also (1891b, 133).
2I modify the Austin translation by borrowing from Russell (1914/1993, 53).
3For the purposes of this paper, I take the thesis to apply only to logico-mathematical concepts.
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Frege could have given a coherent account of misty understanding.4
My main claim is that he could not (his hesitation was indeed well-
placed). stability, as the mature Frege thinks of it, is a thesis about
our grasp of the sense of the concept-words referring to the concepts
that are the targets of our investigations. The obstacle that Frege faces
is that, given the constitutive theses that he holds with regard to sense,
there can be no such thing as misty grasp of a stable sense, for senses
are individuated solely in virtue of their logical features. Any uncer-
taintywith respect to those featuresmeans that, contra stability, one
is getting hold of a different sense (or of no sense altogether). Misty
grasp of sense, then, is an incoherent notion because it is incompat-
ible with the applicability of proper criteria for sense-individuation,
or so I shall argue.
I am aware that the main line of my paper is rather controver-
sial, especially given the wide currency enjoyed by Burge’s sustained
elaboration of the notion of incomplete understanding.5 Neverthe-
less, it seems to me that when we appeal to that notion to defend
some version of stability we are in fact suffering from an illusion
of understanding—the notion of incomplete (or misty) understand-
ing is itself incompletely understood, that is. More modestly, then, in
this paper I aim to raise at least some doubts as to the tenability of a
fairly entrenched interpretation of Frege’s doctrine on this issue.
Perhaps less modestly, there is also a further question that I want to
consider, namely, what I call the problem of normative guidance, the
problem of appropriately locating what Peacocke (1992, 126) called
the constitutive normative liaisons of a concept, the triples of circum-
stances, attitudes and thoughts that competent thinkers must be sen-
sitive to in order to count as competent with a given concept.6 In par-
ticular, competence with a logical concept entails the ability to move
between thoughts (or to have certain attitudes towards specificmoves
between thoughts) in ways that are constrained by the content of that
4I examine Frege’s epistemology of basic logical knowledge in my (2017). Two recent discus-
sions of incomplete understanding of concepts that do not focus specifically on Frege are Buehler
(2014) and Smith (2015).
5Burge (1984, §VI, 1990, §VII). However, Burge (2012, 586) is now countenancing the pos-
sibility that mathematical concepts may change in the transition from partial to complete under-
standing.
6Besides Peacocke’s work, I’m here thinking of the Frege-indebted literature on inferentialism
andmeaning-constituting principles, e.g. Horwich (1998), Eklund (2007), Boghossian (2000, 2001,
2003). I discuss some of the difficulties faced by this family of views in my (2012).
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concept (say, conjunction). The problem of normative guidance,
then, is the problem of explaining both the source of our justification
with respect to correct inference and the specific way in which that
source can also guide us in inference.7 In short, it is the problem of
specifying the what and the how of our acting for a reason in the log-
ical domain.
Now, Frege’s most promising attempt to give an epistemology of the
basic laws of logic was in terms of our grasp of the senses of logical
concept-words (thewhat is the senses, the how is our grasp thereof).8
Patently, stability had to apply to those senses if it had to apply any-
where, since those senses are the only plausible repositories of the
normativity of logic, the only entities where truth-preserving guid-
ance articulated in the form of reasons could be encased. That is to
say, if challenged regarding the validity of a given inferential step,
the thinker could (and should) appeal to the content of the senses in-
volved to justify her reasoning move. It is senses and senses alone,
then, that can give us genuinely citable reasons to infer in accordance
with the laws of logic.9 And this is so because i) Fregean thoughts
(and senses more generally) are individuated in virtue of their per-
spectival reference-determining properties and because ii) it is by ac-
cessing those properties that we are able to move between thoughts
in truth-preserving ways.10 But given that by Frege’s own lights the
senses of the fundamental notions underpinning the mathematical
reasoning system are in fact deeply opaque to our intellection, then
if there is no coherent account of incomplete understanding of sense
available to Frege, the prospects for his epistemology of logic and for
7There is no slip here: within a Fregean framework the rules that guide us in inference are
exactly those that justify the conclusions we reach, modulo the Carroll regress worries that Frege
(1879, §13) acknowledges.
8Frege (1923, 405). Note that for Frege the problem of how basic logical laws are given to us is
the problem of how we are justified in the inferences we carry out. See Frege (1893/2013, II 265)
for the move from mode of being given to justification-maker and (1879, 5; 1893/2013, vi) for the
ultimate justificatory role of basic laws with respect to a deductive system.
9As will be clear, I share McDowell’s (2005, 178) view that the point of sense is “to provide for a
conception of content that fits smoothly with a conception of what rationality requires of a thinker”.
In other words, the content of the senses of the laws of logic states (or unfolds, as Frege would say)
the requirements of rationality under which thinkers ought to operate.
10By ‘perspectival reference-determining properties’ I mean properties that determine reference
from a particular state of (logical) information. It is essential to bear in mind that throughout
this paper I confine myself to a discussion of the senses of logico-mathematical expressions, not
sublunary ones.
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a Fregean solution to the problem of normative guidance look utterly
forlorn. What we would need is an account of mathematical prac-
tice that explains how thinkers can be viewed as responding to the
very same reasons, appropriately located within the relevant senses,
throughout successive developments of that practice. The contention
of this paper is that Frege has, and can have, no such account to of-
fer.11 And if so, it is unclear what can guide and justify us in infer-
ence, for, properly speaking, the incomplete understander seems to
be inferring without any reasons at all, or at least she is inferring by
accessing different reasons than those to which the complete master
of the concept will finally be sensitive.
The plan for the paper is as follows. In §1 I distinguish three ver-
sions of stability. In §2 I raise the Tension between the strongest
version of that thesis and what I take to be the defining marks of
Frege’s conception of sense. In §3 I discuss some likely responses to
the tension and dismiss them all as non-Fregean in character. In §4
I examine a version of the thesis that I call subsumption-stability,
a version that I think better captures Frege’s realism about numbers.
I close by granting that subsumption-stability still fails to locate
normative guidance satisfactorily.
1 The StabilityThesis
As mooted in Grundlagen, stability is a thesis about concepts. In
later work, and with the sense/reference distinction at hand, Frege
states it as a thesis about sense instead. In this section I give three ver-
sions of stability and assess the textual evidence to establish which
version of the thesis we might legitimately ascribe to Frege. My dis-
cussion of the thesis will be restricted to its applicability to the fun-
damental notions of arithmetic, notions such as number, function,
extension/value-range, and so on.
We start with the weakest form of the thesis:12
11I think the issues I discuss here raise a more general problem regarding concept-stability un-
der any conception of what concepts are. For example, Socrates’ maieutic method relied on the
assumption that the conceptual material he was painfully extracting from his victims was already
part of their conceptual repertoire but only incompletely understood and many have followed him
in making that assumption. I think that assumption still lacks substantive defence, however.
12I generalize the thesis as one about mathematical, rather than purely arithmetical concepts.
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concept stability (c-stability) Mathematical concepts remain
constant throughout history
In this form, the thesis is about the reference of concept-words.13 This
is therefore a thesis wholly about the realm of reference, making no
pronouncements regarding the realm of sense. There is no question
that Frege held this thesis.14 A stronger form would be the following:
sense stability (s-stability) Mathematical signs express a con-
stant sense throughout history15
This thesis is a claim about language, it concerns the senses that get
attached to concept-words and it asserts that those senses and not
just their referents remain stable throughout history. Given Frege’s
familiar requirement that sense determine reference, s-stability ob-
viously entails c-stability. The thesis is however silent as to whether
thinkers at different times (or thinkers that diverge in conceptual
competence) grasp those stably expressed senses or other senses in-
stead.
Finally, the strongest version of the thesis, and one that addresses
precisely this last question:
grasp stability (g-stability) Mathematical signs express a con-
stant sense throughout history and thinkers grasp that very
same sense throughout history
Clearly, this version of the thesis is partly about our capacities; it
doesn’t just claim that what signs express remains stable: it also claims
that what thinkers actually grasp—what guides their mathematical
reasoning, that is—remains stable too.
At first blush, g-stability seems the best way of unpacking Frege’s
“as if through a mist” metaphor.16 Or rather, given Frege’s frequent
13For Frege, concepts are the referents of concept-words. See Frege (1884/1987, §51; 1980, 63;
1892/1895, 135).
14See fn. 1.
15Obviously, the thesis is to be indexed to expressions in a particular language (including meta-
languages). For instance, it applies to the German word Anzahl. As we shall see, Frege takes it to
apply to any rational use of a particular language. Burge (2005, 56) seems in no doubt that Frege held
(at least) this version of the view: ”[Frege] regarded his logicist elaboration of ordinary arithmetical
discourse as revealing […] the senses that arithmetical expressions had been expressing all along”
(my emphases). Similarly, on the preceding page Burge states that with respect to the term ‘limit’
Frege “would have regarded it as having a constant sense and denotation”. See also Burge (1990,
260): “the words that Weierstrass uses already express the relevant senses” (my emphasis).
16Frege (1884/1987, 21; 1914a, 211, 217; 1924/25, 270).
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use of that metaphor one is strongly tempted to abduct to the con-
clusion that he was committed to g-stability, since with that thesis
in place one would be forced to think of sense-grasp as something
that admits of degrees. And indeed this is precisely what Tyler Burge,
without question the commentator who deserves the most credit for
drawing attention to the significance of the mist metaphor in Frege’s
conception of sense, has done. For example, here’s how Burge glosses
Frege’s (1914a, 221–222) discussion of Weierstrass:17
[T]he best mathematicians may fail to have a clear grasp of
the senses or thoughts they think with. Nevertheless, […] the
expressions such mathematicians use express definite senses,
definite thoughts. […] The mathematician is thinking with
the sense, and expressing it in his writing, but not grasping it
clearly.
g-stability and misty, or incomplete, understanding go hand in
hand, then. Is Burge correct in attributing g-stability to Frege?
Well, there is one quote that seems to fully support Burge’s reading.
When Frege (1914a, 211) discusses how we can establish whether a
complex sense purporting to give the logical analysis (i.e. the defini-
tion) of an established simple sense is the same as the analysandum,
he has this to say:
[I]f we really do have a clear grasp of the sense of the simple sign,
then it cannot be doubtful whether it agrees with the sense of
the complex expression. If this is open to question […] , then
the reason must lie in the fact that we do not have a clear grasp
of the sense of the simple sign, but that its outlines are confused
as if we saw it through a mist.
On the strength of this passage, Burge’s attribution seems perfectly
faithful to Frege’s thinking, then. Another equally supportive passage
is the following:
[W]hat is called the clarity of a thought in our sense of this word
is really a matter of how thoroughly it has been assimilated or
grasped.18
17Burge (1990, 260). See also (1990, 254; 1998, 353; 2005, 55). As I noted already, Burge (2012,
582-84) seems to tell a different story however, in that the generalised commitment to stability
even in its weakest form is abandoned.
18Frege (1897, 130), my emphasis. This passage, along with all other relevant ones, is discussed
at length in Burge (1990, §§iv-vi).
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This again suggests that the target of our intellectual efforts remains
stable, untouched by any uncertainty in our cognitive efforts. There
is thus a stable object of thought that we grasp, but, as Burge (1990,
259) puts it, grasping it can be a matter of degree.
There are however other passages where the situation is less clear-
cut. For example, Frege (1914b, 234) gives a different slant to the
mist metaphor. In trying to get hold of the correct senses, confused
thinkers are so badly placed, he tells us, that “wenn sie zufassen, sie
daneben greifen”, when they try to grasp them, they fail to get hold of
them.19 The picture here is one where at best it is only s-stability
that is assumed, since the confused speakers are described as either
grasping no sense at all or grasping a different sense altogether.
Moreover, there is also a passage in Frege (1898/1899, 165) where,
in criticising the way Peano had set things up in his system, Frege
speaks of contemporary mathematicians having “a different opinion”
(Meinung) regarding the sense ofmost theorems because they all hold
diverging views regarding the sense attached to the identity sign.
Again, you could take this to support only s-stability.20 We could
read Frege, that is, as saying that while the identity signmay well con-
vey a stable sense, practitioners are instead all grasping (or attaching
to the same expressions) different senses.
The key point for our purposes however is surely revealed by what
Frege says next:
What use are 100,000 theorems, if we ourselves don’t knowwhat
we want to communicate by their means, if the one who uses a
theorem attaches a different thought to it than the one who first
19Frege’s choice of words here rules out g-stability but doesn’t settle the question of what, if
anything, the uncertain reasoner grasps: daneben greifen can be used e.g. to describe someone who
hits a wrong note on the piano or to describe a goalkeeper that misses the ball altogether. One could
of course take this passage to support the claim that Frege held the view that sense-grasp does come
in degrees. In some cases (when the mist is really thick) we don’t grasp a sense at all. In other cases
we grasp it but we are uncertain as to what we have grasped. See also Frege (1891b, 133): “we seek
to grasp [the concept], and in the end we hope to have grasped it, though we may mistakenly have
been looking for something where there was nothing”.
20Frege (1891/1892, 72) is another passage that, taken on its own, may seem to support at most
s-stability. There Frege tells us that in ordinary uses of the word ‘number’ its sense is not brought
forward with the clarity required for scientific use. The rest of that paper makes however clear that
Frege’s target is the confusion between Vorstellung and Sinn. It’s not that ordinary use attaches the
wrong sense: rather, it mistakes an idea for the sense. This, it seems to me, is still consistent with
the claim that reasoners are being guided by the right sense although that sense is (provisionally)
filtered through an idea.
8
proved it?21
And in the parallel passage in Grundgesetze Frege also adds:
If mathematicians’ opinions about equality diverge, then this
means nothing less than that mathematicians disagree with re-
spect to the content of their science[,] that there is no one united
mathematical science, that mathematicians do not, in fact, un-
derstand each other.22
The upshot then is that for Frege unless we assume that all prac-
titioners attach the same sense, mathematics collapses into incoher-
ence. But given that mathematics doesn’t so collapse (for all their
apparent ignorance of senses, the confused mathematicians were still
able to prove theorems after all), we must assume that g-stability
does hold. As Frege (1893/2013, II.iii §58) insists, this is in fact a de-
mand of logic, no less (without that assumption, its laws would have
no applicability across the various temporal stages of the practice).
Frege’s picture, then, is clearly that in order to explain communica-
bility and mathematical progress we must take all mathematicians as
grasping the same sense, even tough they appear to attach different,
idiosyncratic ones to the expressions in question, even though they
seem, on occasion, to hit on thewrong sense altogether or on no sense
at all.
21I think passages such as these raise a problem for e.g. Weiner’s (2010, 36–41) claims that i)
Frege’s definitions (at best) preserve “whatever conceptual content is already associated” with the
fundamental notions of arithmetic as ordinarily used and that ii) the terms expressing those notions
actually lacked a reference prior to his work. Weiner sees Frege as rejecting s-stability (p. 45).
On her view, Frege instead thought that pre-logicist arithmetical statements did not express truths
but could rather be regarded as expressing truths. I’m unclear about two things however. First,
if ordinary statements already have genuine conceptual content (and in Weiner’s use, conceptual
content is equivalent to the later notion of sense, given that she ties it in to the notion of definition),
then how is it that they lack a reference? Secondly, if the conceptual content of ordinary statements
is masked by extra-logical content to the point of failing to secure a reference (i.e. truth value), how
can one rationally regard them as being true? For more on these stubborn issues, see Dummett
(1991b, 176–178) and Blanchette (2012, ch. 4).
22Frege (1893/2013, II.iii 71, fn. 1). See also Frege (1914a, 215, 241–242; 1919, 256). As sug-
gested by an anonymous referee, it would be instructive to compare Frege’s reasoning here with the
much-discussed Aristotle footnote in Über Sinn und Bedeutung. There, Frege moves from stability
of a practice to stability of a family of related senses. Here the move is instead from instability of
senses to instability of the practice. I take Frege’s different treatment of the two cases to provide
grist to my mill. In the case of mathematical discourse, no reliance on guesswork is to be allowed.
All reasoning steps must be open to inspection, and it must be determinate at all times which sense
one is attaching to one’s expressions or else the properly formal status of the language would be under
threat.
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Accordingly, although the textual evidence is not entirely deci-
sive I nonetheless think that we should see Frege as holding that g-
stability is a condition for the rational intelligibility of our math-
ematical practice. Without it in place, the practice (and its rational
reconstruction) would collapse into outright incoherence.23 Indeed,
time and time again Frege tells us that logic demands diachronic sense-
homogeneity as the condition for the possibility of the coming into
being of any genuine definition (i.e. of any genuinely reasons-giving
definitions, definitions that would be able to guide thinkers in infer-
ence).24
Furthermore, there is also another equally important reason why
g-stability must be in place. If we combine Frege’s (1914a, 247)
striking anticipation of Quine’s (1970, 81) meaning variance argu-
ment with the remarks I quote below from the same work, we can
see that g-stability is also required to ensure that logicism doesn’t
change the subject as a result of its process of analysis of the funda-
mental notions of arithmetic:
How little value is commonly placed on sense and definitions
can be seen from the sharply conflicting accounts that math-
ematicians give of what number is. […] Each of these [i.e.,
Weierstrass, Heine, and Thomae] attaches a different sense to
the word ‘number’. So the arithmetic of these three mathemati-
cians must be quite different.[…] How can one possibly imag-
ine that [three] quite different sciences should really have the
same content? Is it only because they are [all] called arithmetic
and [they all] treat of numbers, although what is called a num-
ber in one is quite different from what is called a number in the
other? Or is it not the explanation rather that we have really to
dowith the same science; that thisman does attach substantially
the same sense to the word number as that man, only he doesn’t
quite succeed in grasping it correctly?25
23It’s not just a question of giving a coherent account of the practice: it is rather that we need to
view practitioners as rational, as being on the lookout for reasons, and for the right reasons at that.
In response to a worry by an anonymous referee, let me point out that for Frege the crucial issue
remains, at all times, that of the rational justification of a practice. Ifmathematicians establish results
by methods of proof that openly contradict the definitions from which those proofs start, then the
results, however stellar they might be, will always lack justification, and hence the mathematicians’
beliefs will remain ungrounded. It is in this sense that the practice is incoherent, since it contradicts
the explicitly given basic concepts on which it is taken to rest.
24Much of part III of book II of Grundgesetze is taken up by a constant attack against piecemeal
definitions precisely on the grounds discussed in the text.
25Frege (1914a, 215–217), slightly modified translation. The meaning-variance passage clearly
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Here it seems clear that Frege is holding that sameness of understood
senses, before and after the logicist analysis that he is striving to pro-
vide, is essential for the diachronic and synchronic shareability of
a given practice. Nothing but (complete) understanding of senses
can mandate acceptance of the basic laws of arithmetic. Nothing but
a common object of the understanding can ensure that the various
time-slices of a practice count as slices of the same practice. Same-
ness of normatively guided practice, that is, entails sameness of sense
for its fundamental notions, no matter how approximate the actual
grasp by practitioners might be.
g-stability, then, is, quite simply, a non-negotiable feature of any
proper Fregean conception of these matters, or so it seems. And g-
stability brings with it the claim that sense-grasp may be a matter
of degree, that insufficiently alert thinkers do grasp the correct senses
but only with incomplete understanding, as if through an epistemic
mist.
2 The Tension
The burden of this section is to argue for a claim that seems to scup-
per the conception of normative guidance outlined in the introduc-
tion. I want to argue that although Frege was indeed implicitly com-
mitted to g-stability, he did not and could not provide an account
of misty understanding that would be compatible with his concep-
tion of sense. My main claim will be that by Frege’s own lights there
can be no such thing as misty grasp of a sense. Sense-grasp, that is,
cannot come in degrees, for there is a tension between the very idea
that senses could be tentatively grasped and the constitutive theses
that Frege held with regard to sense—what is grasped in incomplete
understanding cannot be a Fregean sense.26 And if so, the incom-
plete understander lacks reasons, logically-grounded reasons, that is,
for inferring the way she does. Much as Frege needed to have g-
locates normative guidance in sense-understanding: “so long as I understand the words ‘straight
line’, ‘parallel’ and ‘intersect’ as I do, I cannot but accept the parallel axiom”. See also Frege (1980,
183, fn. 7).
26Burge (1990, 247) raises anddismisses a related tension that exploits themove from incomplete
understanding to grasp of a vague concept which in turn would not be a concept at all by Frege’s
lights. The tension I raise here concerns instead the possibility of the transition from incomplete to
complete understanding of stable senses that Burge (and Frege) assume.
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stability in place in order to realise his philosophical goals, then,
it was his own conception of sense that made that requirement im-
possible to satisfy.
I’ll now try to sustain this claim. First, we should note that g-
stability entails, as we observed at the end of the last section, that
there is a common object of the understanding shared by both partial
and full understanding, a stable sense, a stable provider of reasons
that one tracks as one moves from tentative to fully secure grasp of
its content.
Secondly, we should also note that Frege seems to give two con-
trasting models of misty understanding.
In the Grundlagen introduction, misty understanding is confused
understanding. We somehow hook onto the logical core of the con-
cepts, but that core is obscured by foreign and dispensable features.
On this model, we take in too much content. Alternatively, we could
say that we fail to recognise the logical core as logical and the foreign
additions as what they really are, elements of the content that have
no logical import. Either way, confused understanding is unfocused
understanding, allowing extraneous stuff into the target content. The
question then is whether by Frege’s own lights unfocused understand-
ing can properly be said to be understanding of the same sense that
one grasps in properly focused understanding.
In later work, Frege’s model is different: misty understanding is in-
complete or partial understanding. It’s not that we take in too much;
this time we take in too little instead, we leave out essential parts of
the content. Partial understanding, on this model, is understanding
of partial content. There is support for this attribution in the follow-
ing passage, again from his discussion of Weierstrass’s epistemic sit-
uation:
One can draw correct inferences even though part of the sense
always remains obscure to us.27
If we set aside the concerns that one could (or perhaps should) have
regarding Frege’s often extremely cautious way of characterising the
misty understanding predicament, it seems clear that what Frege is
saying here is that partialmastery of content is precisely that: one has
only mastered part of the concept, one is missing out some elements
27Frege (1914b, 240).
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of the sense’s content.28
In itself the move, as Frege outlines it, is harmless: it is indeed pos-
sible to infer correctly even if part of the sense is beyond reach be-
cause it is conceivable that partial masters of a logical concept could
be drawing valid inferences at all times while not drawing all the valid
inferences that they could draw, were the content of the sense avail-
able in its entirety.
What is not harmless, however, is Frege’s apparent claim that in-
complete masters of a sense can grasp (and deploy) the very same
sense grasped by complete masters even though part of its content
is in the penumbra.29 If we miss out part of the sense, then contra
Burge (1990, 260) we cannot be “thinking with the sense”; we can
only be thinking with another sense, or perhaps even with no sense at
all.
In other words, Frege’s conception of sense leaves no room whatso-
ever for the contrast betweenmistaken application of a correct proce-
dure and correct application of a mistaken procedure.30 Or to phrase
28The notion of understanding is at least as fuzzy as that of sense and sense-grasp. In the phi-
losophy of language, it is often glossed in terms of knowledge. Pettit (2002, 521) labelled this ap-
proach the epistemic view of understanding, whereby one equates understanding an expression e
with knowing what e means. If we adopted this view, partial understanding of sense would be
partial knowledge of sense. But sense, at least with respect to mathematical notions, is something
that contains purely propositional content. And I struggle to make sense of any notion of partial
knowledge of content that is not knowledge of partial content. Any alternative notion would have
to reify senses (in effect treating knowledge of senses as a form of de re knowledge), thus trigger-
ing the regress discussed in fn. 40, p. 19 below. A further alternative strategy also discussed below
would be to include psychological and non-conceptual capacities to account for misty grasp (see
e.g. Burge 2012, 577), thus blocking the move frommisty sense-grasp to grasp of misty senses. This
strategy would fairly obviously fall foul of Frege’s anti-psychologism though. This is perhaps the
place to deal with another possible complaint. In raising the tension, I move from considerations
to do with sense-grasp to conclusions aboutwhat is being grasped (I move, just as Burge (1990, 247)
does, from uncertain grasp to grasp of uncertainly defined content). I think the move is perfectly
legitimate. If senses are ways of thinking, then sense-grasp is thinking with a sense, that is, making
the particular way of thinking of the referent prescribed by the sense one’s own way of thinking of
that referent. If so, misty sense-grasp can only be a misty way of thinking of the referent, precisely
because to grasp a sense is nothing other than to deploy it. Note that this remark also applies when
we think of sense-grasp as an ability (see p. 20 below). If sense-grasp is an ability, sense-content too
will have ability-like constituents. However, as I argue below, at this point we have psychologised
sense beyond comfort. See Kremer (2010, 281ff.).
29To my knowledge, Textor (2011, 147–148) is the only commentator that has questioned the
coherence of Frege’s talk of partial sense-grasp.
30Dummett’s (1973, 93) procedural view of sense is criticised in Burge (1990, 244). Let me dis-
pose of a possible objection here. One might complain that there’s a way of saving the contrast
discussed in the text. We could say, with McGee (1985, 469), that on occasion we may be able to
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it less controversially: it obliterates the distinction between confus-
edly thinking with the correct sense and clearly thinking with the
wrong sense, between a way of thinking that is unfaithful to the con-
tent of the correct sense and a way of thinking that is instead faithful
to a wrong, neighbouring sense. Given that conception, Frege simply
lacks the resources to tell the two cases apart.
Now, Frege’s two models of incomplete understanding are clearly
distinct and for mymain claim that misty grasp of sense is incompat-
ible with g-stability to go through I need to tackle them separately.
In particular, while I think that there is a clear and indeed stark prob-
lem for the Fregean model of partial understanding, I am less confi-
dent that the earlier model of unfocused understanding gives rise to
the tension in the same direct manner.
At this point, one might in any case complain that since Frege
did not provide firm criteria of sense-identity, it is unclear how one
could even begin to argue for my claim that he cannot hold on to
g-stability. In response, I would however say that Frege has said
enough about sense to provide uswith criteria for sense-individuation
that suffice to sustain the conclusion that failure to grasp the entire
content of a given sense (or failure to grasp that content as the uncon-
taminated content it is) would amount to failure to grasp that sense
as the sense it is.
Let me now try to substantiate this response while also preparing
the ground for stating the tension more precisely.
I think we can get a good enough grip on Frege’s general conception
of sense from what he says about one specific kind of sense, namely,
the sense of a declarative sentence, the thought that the sentence,
properly disambiguated, expresses.31 A thought, Frege tells us, is that
for which the question of truth and falsity can arise, it is something
not to be identified with the content of anyone’s consciousness, and
judge that e.g. an instance of a rule of inference is valid without being in a position to recognise or
understand the full content of the rule, that is, without being able to tell which rule it is (mutatis
mutandis for logico-mathematical concepts more generally). I think the move is very interesting.
It would however provide no solace to the Fregean, since stability is a thesis about rules, not in-
stances. I should perhaps also make clear that I consider the inability to articulate that contrast to
be a merit of Frege’s conception, for I think that the contrast is ultimately illusory. And its illusory
nature masks a general problem about concept-grasp that Frege’s conception usefully brings into
view.
31Frege (1914a, 206) makes it clear that by ‘sentence’ (Satz) he means utterance-tokens too, not
just written tokens.
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it stands in no need of interpretation; a thought remains unaffected
by mood and colouring, and finally it is that which gets preserved
in translation across languages or in surface linguistic transforma-
tions.32
In short, a thought contains nothing but what is of interest to logic,
nothing but what contributes to the determination of its truth condi-
tion, nothing but the reference-determining properties belonging to
its constituent parts. It leaves no room for psychological or language-
specific idiosyncrasies.33 We can reach the same conclusion from an-
other direction as well. We can, that is, start from Frege’s (1897, 142)
dictum that grammar is “a mixture of the logical and the psycholog-
ical”. We then recall that for Frege the task of logic is to isolate and
insulate the purely logical kernel in grammar—all and only thatwhich
matters to inference.34 Thought, then, is what we get from grammar
when we subtract any locally-inflected, that is, language- or thinker-
relative factors, be they linguistic or psychological.35
If this is what a thought, i.e. sentential sense, is, it then seems as if
it can be so only if sub-sentential sense is also devoid of any extra-
logical features or else those features would presumably be transmit-
ted upwards by the sense-compositional operations. It thus seems to
follow that sense in general contains no features other than logical
32Frege (1918-19b, 353; 1914a, 209, 1918-19a, 376; 1906, 315; 1897, 140–141, 1906a, 193, 1906b,
198, 1918-19b, 357, 1891a, 357, 1892b, 161, 1980, 67, 1906a, 193; 1897, 141–142, 1914a, 206, 216)
respectively.
33It is unfortunate that Frege’s most famous essay, Über Sinn und Bedeutung, should have en-
couraged the idea that sense could include extra-logical features. Burge (1979, 239) may well be
right that “Frege’s focus on logic blurred his vision of epistemology” in the case of the sense of in-
dexical expressions. A more appropriate reading would however be that the sublunary examples
were mere heuristics that Frege employed to bolster his explication of a novel notion, that of sense,
that was required to account for themathematical fact that the same entity can be recognised in dif-
ferent ways—Frege (1884, §62, 1897, 142). In the context we are discussing in this paper, namely,
that of the fundamental notions of arithmetic, there is no room for any psycological-cognitive in-
filtration since here we are dealing with nonindexical thoughts only. Sense, as far as those notions
are concerned, can only contain what is of value to logical knowledge. And logic has no truck with
properties other than reference-determining ones. Indeed, Frege (1918-19b, 352) makes it very
clear that any psychological infiltrations would nullify one’s justification for a given claim.
34Frege (1879, 6, 12; 1879/1891, 5; 1880/1881a, 33, fn.; 1897, 142; 1980, 79). One quote for
all: “One should make only those distinctions [between thoughts] with which the laws of logic are
concerned” (1980, 67). Note that within Frege’s framework, nothing but reference-determining
properties are of relevance to inference (it is reference-determining properties that prevent us from
moving from names of the True to names of the False).
35See the entire passage at Frege (1897, 141–144) as well as (1893/2013, xix), (1914a, 216) and
(1892b, 162, fn. 7).
15
ones—no features that could be shed (or misread) with impunity as
far as logic is concerned, that is.36
2.1 Confronting the Tension
I am now in a position to state the tension. Let me start by raising it
with respect to Frege’s secondmodel ofmisty understanding. On that
model, misty understanding is understanding of partial content. But
if senses only contain logical material and if, as seems clear, senses are
individuated purely in virtue of those features, then leaving out essen-
tial logical features of a given sense straightforwardly entails that any
thinker who only grasps part of that sense is in fact getting hold of
another sense, or rather: of no sense at all (since crucial reference-
determining material is being left out). In missing out part of the
sense, that is, we are in fact missing out essentialmarks (to use Frege’s
term) that make that sense the sense it is. That is to say, any variation
in the apprehended profile of a sense entails a difference in appre-
hended sense.37 Accordingly, the austere conception of sense that I
have attributed to Frege has left no room for dispensable features of
sense, features that one might fail to grasp without affecting the indi-
36And so Frege’s (1892b, 158) famous metaphor that sense contains the mode of being given of
the referent must be unpacked as: the mode of being given for the purposes of logic. Similarly, one
could give a quick little argument for the same conclusion reached in the text. Frege (1980, 191)
tells us that the laws of number must be developed by purely logical means (see also ibid.: 141).
Sense is the essential means to that development (since it grounds the normative status of the basic
laws—Frege 1923, 405). Hence, sense must be a purely logical notion or else numbers would be
given to us by means that are not purely logical.
37For arguments to that effect see e.g. Diamond (1984, 124) and Dummett (1990b, 277; 1989,
306, 311). As Sullivan (2004, 687) usefully puts it: “there is no such thing as a faulty expression of
a content which even so expresses that content”. Mutatis mutandis, this applies to grasp of sense-
content too. There is a possibility that I do not discuss in the text, namely, the possibility that the
parts the thinker leaves out are in fact logical in character—the incompletely understood sense
overdetermines reference. The issues raised by this possibility are rather complex. Let me just say
here that this option would be no threat to my account. First, Frege never claims that in misty
understanding one is grasping part of the sense clearly and the whole sense confusedly. Rather,
what Frege claims is that it is the sense as a whole that is grasped confusedly, if at all. Secondly, if
the sense-part we grasp is already a genuine Fregean sense, as it must, then it already has reference-
determining properties. But by the familiar cognitive criterion of sense difference, the thinker could
always rationally doubt it is co-referential with the complete sense. If so, Frege’s (1895, 125) crucial
requirement that the step from sense to reference be determinate “beyond doubt” would be violated.
Furthermore, to think that a sense could have redundant logical features would be to confuse a sense
with the words used to express it, a mistake against which Frege (1899-1906, 167) had warned us in
no uncertain terms. Finally, as Frege (1880/1881b, 43) makes clear, logically superfluous material
“reduces” the content of a thought (and hence it determines a different thought).
16
viduation conditions for that sense.38
With the first model the tension is less straightforward to raise. In
fact, in this case the risk is that I may be establishing too much—if
things are as bad as I claim then there is no prospect of ever being
able to make any progress in our reflective enquiries. Let’s see why.
Recall that on the first model, misty understanding is unfocused
understanding of sense. What happens here is that the logical kernel
of the sense is partly hidden from sight because of “foreign” accre-
tions. The model divides into two cases depending on whether the
undesirable accretions are logical or non-logical.
In the first case, the problem is uncertainty as to the logical features
of sense (in the way in which for instance Frege might have been con-
fused about the content of Basic Law V, assuming that somewhere in
the Third Realm there is an unimpeachable version of that law that
Frege was trying to reach as if through a mist). I think this case is
easy to deal with. The reasoning I deployed to deal with partial under-
standing, if sound, will apply here too: the additional but troublesome
logical material, that is, will individuate a different sense anyway,
leading again to a failure of stability.39 This is particularly clear in
the case of Basic LawVwhere themistily apprehended sense provides
wholly unreliable normative guidance, since it licences, in conjunc-
tion with the rest of Frege’s system, the derivation of any proposition
whatsoever. The properly grasped sense had better be other than the
mistily grasped one, then.
In the second case, the extraneous additions are non-logical in
character and so they will presumably play no role in guiding infer-
ence. For the same reason, they will play no part in individuating the
sense as distinct from the one that will eventually be grasped after
38In other words, given that conception, there is no room for the possibility of the sort of “pro-
jection beyond actual understanding and use” with regard to sense-content that Burge (1990: 261)
argues for. And there is a very good reason for that impossibility. As Kripke (2001: 255) correctly
notes, we specify a Fregean sense by specifying the reference it determines. But with concepts, a
misty specification of reference is a specification of a different concept, for individuation conditions
for Fregean logical concepts do not admit of degree.
39To use one of Frege’s (1892b, 158) own examples: the sense of ‘point of intersection of a, b and
c’ is clearly distinct from the sense of ‘point of intersection of a and b’ and it seems implausible to
claim that someone grasping the latter is confusedly grasping the former. Moreover, in the case of
concept-words (our only concern in this paper), the concept-definition grasped by the full under-
stander is, patently, not one that contains redundancies. It is rather one that makes the concept, at
last, precise (e.g. totally defined over all cases), and like all elegant theoretical definitions, it does so
without redundancies.
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the mist has been dispelled. If so, the tension seems not to arise at all.
But the problem with this sub-case for the first model is that it seems
to commit Frege to the claim that we could grasp, as part of grasp-
ing a sense, non-logical features too. So, what we end up grasping
is neither the same sense as the one we would grasp if we could get
rid of the impurities, nor a different sense (for those impurities make
no contribution to determining the sense as the sense it is). Rather,
what we grasp is not a sense at all, properly speaking, precisely be-
cause we are grasping the impurities as constituents of that putative
sense, rather than as external add-ons. We are making, in effect, a
category mistake as to the individuating features of that sense. And
so, once again, we have a failure of stability.
The reasoning that leads to this conclusion seems sound, given the
austere conception of sense. But as I said, it also seems to prove too
much. If the process of logicist analysis consists in clarifying the re-
ceived senses of the fundamental notion of arithmetic, and if those
notions are enveloped in impurities to be removed by analysis, how
can one even claim that the analysis targets those notions in the first
place? Here we seem to face a deeper paradox of analysis, a paradox
not just about informativeness but about expressibility too. If a sense
can only come fully into view as the sense it is only after we have
provided the appropriate analysans how can we possibly say what is
the target analysandum before the process of analysis is completed?
Analysis, if the reasoning above is sound, seems just like a shot in the
dark.
Unpalatable as this conclusion might be, however, at this stage I
can’t see a way for Frege to avoid reaching it. Given Frege’s con-
stitutive commitment to an austere conception of sense, that is, g-
stability and misty understanding can only be incompatible phe-
nomena, since we have examined all themodels of misty understand-
ing that Frege seems to have considered and we have found them all
wanting.
This seems to leave us with a rather nasty dilemma. Either we give
up stability, thereby abandoning Frege’s preferred characterisation
of the philosophical significance of logicism, or we give up some of
the constitutive theses of sense, thus allowing unwanted psychologis-
tic elements back into the grammar of inference.
In the next section, I examine some ways of thinking of incomplete
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understanding that Frege did not consider, as well as some other sug-
gestions one could make to escape the tension.
3 Responding to the Tension
I think there are two broad strategies one might want to pursue in
response to the tension. One strategy would involve modifying both
the notion of sense and that of understanding. The other strategy
would instead embrace the loss of g-stability, the consequences be
damned.40
Under the first line of response we attempt to escape the tension by
suitably enriching the notion of sense, just enough to defuse the ten-
sion, and no more. After all, Frege (1892b, 158) told us that senses
contain modes of reference-determination, not that those modes ex-
haust the content of sense. There might thus be other material, per-
haps non-propositional, that “surrounds” and supports the sense’s
kernel, the part that does the reference-determining job. The ques-
tion now is whether the resultant, less austere notion is compatible
with the key tenets of the Fregean conception of sense. It is useful
here to introduce a new term for sense, namely, conception. Senses,
on this proposal, are conceptions of the target concept (recall that we
are restricting our discussion to the senses of concept-words).41 Con-
ceptions may be richer than senses because they are not just given to
us by stating bodies of propositions.42 They are, rather, explained
in terms of (and constituted by) bodies of information, information
that may well include sub-propositional states as well.43 Clearly, this
40The suggestion that we take senses as objects and thus recover more familiar models of object-
tracking (as opposed to the highly problematic notion of concept-tracking) can be quickly dis-
pensed with. Senses are ways referents are given to us, but they are not (and cannot) themselves
(be) given to us. Any temptation to think otherwise would trigger a vicious regress, for if senses
too came with modes of presentation, so would also those higher-order ways of being given, and so
on without end. See Bell (1987), Dummett (1986, 1989, 1990a,b), Beaney (1996, 219–220), Kremer
(2010, 288–289), and Burge (2012, 574–575).
41The conception/concept distinction was first applied to Frege’s framework in Wiggins
(1980/2001, 10; 1984, 128, fn. 6; 1994, 207). Burge’s (1989, 282) early term for conceptions had
been ‘conceptual explications’. The distinction, as used in a Fregean context, is by and large orthog-
onal to the way it has been wielded by Hart (1961/2012, 246) and Rawls (1971/1999, 5).
42As Grundlagen §62 tells us, to give a sense is to give the sense of a sentence in which the
expression whose sense it is occurs. And so in the case of the fundamental notions of arithmetic,
their senses are given as propositional constituents of definitions.
43E.g. Burge (2012, 577) includes psychological states that can be “conceptual or non-conceptual,
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revised and less austere notion of sense opens up the way to a less
austere notion of understanding as well.
For illustration, let’s look at two sense-enriching suggestions that
fully respect g-stability by construing sense-grasp (and sense-
deployment) as the ability to think (more or less efficiently) with a
concept (through the sense).44
The first suggestion diagnoses incomplete understanding as defec-
tive understanding at the explicit level only. Conceptions, that is, split
up into two levels, implicit and explicit. To possess a concept is simply
to be able to tap into one’s implicit conception even though one may
be unable explicitly to articulate its content. The explicitly given con-
ception is defective, the implicit conception (the ground-level ability,
as it were) is correct and it underpins appropriate use of the concept.
On this view, incomplete understanding is implicit grasp of the right
content, despite one’s shortcomings at the level of explicit articulation
of that content.45
Avariant suggestion (Burge 2012, 579, fn. 59) is that the incomplete
understander has grasped the right conceptual material, but not quite
in the right order. One possesses all the constituent components, but
one lacks the proper structuring for those components, that is.46 The
partial master of the concept, then, is not leaving out parts of the
content, but rather of the way the content is structured. Or rather:
the understander already possesses the conceptualmaterial that could
fully articulate the content one thinks when deploying the concept,
but has not gathered together that material as what one really thinks
when one thinks of that concept with the (faulty) conception.
Misty grasp so construed is, as Burge (2012, 580) notes, a failure of
performance rather than of competence, it is uncertain deployment
cognitive or not”.
44I extract them from the taxonomy given in Burge (2012, 573-589) (see also Burge 2006, 165).
Burge often speaks of understanding as an ability, and one that mobilises non-conceptual resources
too (e.g. 2003a, 394). For Dummett’s view of understanding as a “capacity to engage in a common
practice” see e.g. his (1973, 293; 1981, 245).
45The view is articulated and defended in Peacocke (1998a,b). For criticism see Schiffer (1998),
Rey (1998) and Burge (2003b; 2003c, 517). Note that Peacocke doesn’t generally embrace g-
stability (1998b, 63). For him, implicit conceptions can evolve as our reflective efforts increase
their precision and in the case of set he thinks that c-stability fails too.
46This tallies well with Frege’s (1884/1987, §88; 1880/1881a, 34) insistence that definitions be
more than a list, that they organise the characteristicmarks of a concept in the appropriate, “organic”
way.
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of understanding-qua-ability—an implicitly assimilated stable sense
is got hold of by insufficiently polished skills, as it were.
Would these two options be acceptable to the Fregean? I don’t think
they would, and, very briskly, for the following reasons. First, it is
not clear on what basis one could uniquely identify abilities of this
sort with the underlying implicit conceptions, nor is it at all clear
what explanatory value would accrue from that purported identifica-
tion (i.e. we’d be losing a grip on the old fitting/guiding contrast that
Quine (1972) rightly insisted upon, we’d be unable to tell whether
the conceptions merely fit patterns of usage as opposed to determin-
ing them).47 Secondly, and relatedly, if we think of conceptions as
implicitly-grounded abilities we are in effect thinking of them as dis-
positions and thus as unsuitable, in the eyes of many (and certainly of
Frege), to play a genuinely normative role.
Furthermore, with these suggestions at hand we are now thinking
of senses as entities that “type-individuate psychological competen-
cies” and that are themselves “aspects of certain psychological kinds”
(Burge 2012, 576), including, as already noted, non-propositional
ones. But unless we buy Burge’s (2012, 577) claim that, properly seen,
Frege’s philosophy not only de-psychologizes logic but psychology as
well, so that all world-involving states, including psychological ones,
are to be explained in terms of truth and reference, we are highly un-
likely to accept that this enrichment of the austere conception of sense
would accomodate Frege’s hostility towards any anchoring of logic to
notions that bear local, contingent relations to the specific make-up
of beings such as we are.
To put it pithily, it seems tome any attempt to preserve g-stability
by making sense-grasp stable only at the implicit level faces the prob-
lem that we won’t be able to characterise our acting (in this case: our
reasoning about mathematics, our doing proofs and so on) as acting
done for a reason, indeed as acting done in the light of a reason. To
the extent that implicit conceptions are nomore than tacitly followed
dispositions, they do not and can not provide reasons, certainly not
reasons of the kind that Frege (1898/1899, 157) wanted to locate in
senses and sense-grasp in order to answer the how-question concern-
47I’m very brisk on the first point here because a fuller discussion would merely duplicate Rey
(1998, §§1.1-1.2). On the second point, see the analogous discussion about tacit knowledge of
meaning-theorems in Evans (1981) and Wright (1986, 227).
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ing mathematics that he so cared about:
If you ask what constitutes the value of mathematical knowl-
edge, the answer must be: not so much what is known as how
it is known.48
Dispositions won’t do anything to answer the how-question in terms
of effective normative guidance, in terms of the normative liaisons
between our attitudes towards a particular inference step and what
we take to be the content of the relevant concepts being appealed to in
the circumstances.
In particular, whenever Frege discusses these matters (see e.g.
1914a, 221), the crucial missing justificatory element in non-logicist
mathematical practice is said to be sufficient clarity and rigour in the
definition (i.e. the sense) attached to an expression and in the extent
to which use is actually being guided by the definition. What so exer-
cises Frege, that is, is the glaring hiatus between openly given defini-
tions and actual practice in pre- and non-logicist mathematics. More
precisely, it is the conflict between overtly espoused definitions and
actual proof-conduct that makes it impossible for Frege to treat the
mathematician as rationally justified in what she does. E.g. Weier-
strass gave himself rules only to flout them, in a wilful display of in-
verted akrasia, as it were (he did the right thing by disregarding the
wrong rules he’d explicitly adopted and defended).49
As far as Frege is concerned, then, settled first-order patterns in a
defective practice, nomatter how correct theymay be, are not enough
to provide a vindication of our knowledge claims precisely because
neither the explicitly given rules nor the implicitly adhered-to dispo-
sitions would count as reasons in the appropriate sense (remember:
what matters is the how not thewhat). Only properly formulated def-
initions can provide rational guidance for our practice, and what lies
on either side of the divide between complete and incompletemastery
of our concepts must be stuff of the same kind (whereas ex hypoth-
esi what we have here is a fairly brute transition from dispositions to
48Note that to provide a satisfactory how-answer of this kind would in effect be to solve the
problem of normative guidance.
49Frege’s diagnosis ofWeierstrass’ situation is a clear instance of the problem of normative guid-
ancemademanifest. The senses thatWeierstrass consciously grasped, as reflected in his definitions,
were defective, and hence incapable of providing full guidance. Something else guided him to true,
but unjustified, conclusions, and our problem is precisely to specify what did so.
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definitions).
I now want to consider instead what seems the most obvious way
of weakening g-stability. Under this suggestion, one would bite the
bullet concerning the epistemic costs of losing the normative guid-
ance given by stable senses and just say that c-stability is the best a
Fregean can hope for (something like a reflective equilibrium strategy
will be required to assess competing senses).50 We concede that it is
the reference only (the concept) and not the sense (the conception)
that remains stable. After all, as Frege (1891b, 133) peremptorily said,
“for a logical concept there is no development, no history”, and this
contrasts with our understanding (i.e. our conception) that, as he also
noted (1893/2013, II, 256) while reeling from the raw shock of Rus-
sell’s paradox, often requires “correction”.
On this proposal, then, the claim is that we do succeed in deploy-
ing the stable concept in our judgements even if the conception we
adopted to do so is defective.51 One perfectly natural way of unfold-
ing this suggestion would be to say that misty understanding is grasp
of a sense that is sufficiently similar to the one we will grasp after the
appropriate conceptual analysis has been carried out.52 All that nor-
mative guidance demands, one might add, is the requirement that
there be a sufficiently large fragment intersecting the two senses even
though they are not strictly speaking the same.53
Would c-stability so construed be compatible with Frege’s other
views? I’m afraid I don’t think that it would.
First, if the two senses across the complete/incomplete divide do
50I am again excluding the radical option to say that neither conceptions nor concepts remain
stable. As Imade clear at the opening, this would run counter to Frege’s insistence that amove of this
kind would altogether incapacitate our cognitive activities. As a variant of this radical option, Burge
(2012, 582–588) draws yet another distinction between fairly generic ur-concepts that get sharpened
or broadened by successive elaborations. Burge then argues that while in some cases concept-use
that precedes full explication of the concept’s content may be guided by those generic concepts, in
other cases, notably themathematical ones of concern to us, even ur-conceptsmay undergo “several
tracks of elaboration” (p. 587) so that in fact a new concept is developed (p. 586).
51This is e.g. the diagnostics offered for conceptual history more generally by Stephen Schiffer
and reported in Higginbotham (1998, 155).
52Burge (1979, 223) rules out this option: “Frege did not think that the sense of a nonindexical
expression […] varies with the speaker”.
53In different terminology, the proposal is in effect inviting us to distinguish between concept-
possession and concept-mastery. Incomplete understanding is compatible with concept-possession
(i.e. minimal competence with the concept). Concept-mastery requires instead full understanding
(i.e. thorough understanding of the internal structure of concepts).
23
differ, then although of course it is perfectly possible (and indeed
highly likely) that they might co-refer we would nevertheless lack
a logical guarantee that they do in fact co-refer, that they pick the
same concept, the same fundamental notion. In short, that they are
demonstrably subject-matter-preserving (the danger, that is, is that
distinct senses, even if similar, may define significantly distinct con-
cepts).54
Secondly, and taking up this last point, recall that the senses at stake
in our investigation are in fact definitions of the fundamental con-
cepts of arithmetic, such as e.g. the concept of number.55 These def-
initions are intended to make manifest the logical content of those
notions. Accordingly, if we tried to explain misty understanding in
terms of a family of sufficiently similar senses, we would run afoul of
Frege’s (1893/2013, II.iii §60, 73) fulminations against giving double
explanations of the same sign. Such explanations would give rise to
“doubt whether the definitions contradict each other”.56 We would
require, Frege adds, at least a proof that no contradiction could be
engendered by the diverging definitions—wewould need a fresh war-
rant for each definition and for each further modification we give as
our understanding gets progressively more secure.
Crucially, Frege’s suggested repair against double explanations is to
treat the signs thus defined as different signs.57 So, in effect, positing
sufficiently similar senses amounts to saying that they attach to dif-
ferent signs altogether, notwithstanding the surface identity of those
54The passage in Frege (1914b, 240) is puzzling. Frege first states that senses are “not to be
identified with the content of anyone’s consciousness”, largely because of their synchronic unfath-
omability (e.g. we can never apprehend all at once the sense attached to the expression ‘integral’).
He then adds that despite this one can confidently deploy incompletely grasped senses in correctly
drawn inferences. But if we can only access a segment of a sense at a given point in time because
of our cognitive limitations, what logical guarantee do we have that the segment we accessed is a
segment of that very concept that we can never grasp in its entirety?
55See e.g. part IV of Frege (1884). A passage in the very late Frege (1924/25, 271) is, again,
admittedly rather puzzling, since there Frege tells us that function is a logically simple notion that
resists analysis and can only be elucidated (see also 1893/2013, 4 and 1906, 300). At least for the case
of number, however, he seems to have continued to think that it is analysable by logical means, or
else it would really be hard to make any sense of his entire project. Dummett (1981, ch. 14; 1991b,
ch. 14) are useful. See also Weiner (2001) for a different assessment of Frege’s position.
56Frege (1893/2013, II.iii 141) expresses similar worries. See also Frege (1980, 113-15).
57This is paralled in Frege’s (1914a, 213) remarks against polysemy: a unique sense must be
attached to an expression fit for scientific purposes. It does not suffice that it be determinate which
separate senses attach to a single expression: in scientific discourse, senses and signs must be in a
1-1 correspondence. See also Frege (1906, 303) and the discussion in May (2006).
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signs. In fact, this move would amount to a change of language. And
this, again, would threaten, at the very least, the claim that logicism
is subject-matter preserving.
Thirdly, if senses are the only locus of normative guidance, and if
we have two competing senses with respect to what looks like a single
fundamental notion, then it becomes unclear what provides norma-
tive guidancewhen it comes to adjudicating between those two senses
(or when it comes to settlingwhether they are co-referential, or inten-
sionally equivalent, or free from contradiction once admitted to the
same language). And indeed, in considering issues of this kind, Frege
could do no better than appeal to self-evidence to settle the question
of whether or not two senses are equivalent.58
There is also a fourth problem with this response. As I have already
pointed out, Frege (1914a, 221) is quite explicit that in incomplete
understanding what one lacks is the provision of a system—the sys-
tem is the genuine mist-buster. That is to say, partial grasp of sense
is indeed, by Frege’s lights, grasp that misses out (or misconstrues)
some crucial component. The target one hits is genuinely wrong, de-
fective, incomplete (or unfocused). So, the two senses cannot be suf-
ficiently similar: for logicism to have any significance, the “received
sense” must be gravely defective. Indeed, Frege’s chief point of pride
was to have shown the sort of substantial addition to current mathe-
matical practice that was required tomake it scientifically respectable
(namely, the construction of a system that would allow full specifica-
tion of the senses of the fundamental notions).
Now, one might complain that I am overlooking another way of
looking at our predicament. Why can’t we say that c-stability and s-
stability both hold, that the languagewe use stably expresses senses
that stably pick stable concepts even if we lack proper access to those
senses? Nothing I have said so far has ruled out this option. After
all, the problems I raised were all triggered by the attempt to hold
on to g-stability in some way or other. The complaint is, I think,
well-taken. But the picture that would emerge is one whereby users
and the language they employ would be wholly disconnected. If the
considerations I rehearsed in this section and the previous one are
58Frege (1914a, 210–211). As I said earlier, one could argue that something like reflective equi-
librium would guide us in picking the correct sense. But given that the senses involved are located
at the foundational level of logicality, the familiar problem is that it is unclear which background
logic one could use to adjudicate between the competing options.
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sound, it seems as if there can be no engagement at all between ex-
pressed and grasped senses as long as the former are taken to be stable.
And if so, then the pressing question is: would there be any point to
jointly holding on to the two weaker forms of stability other than
as a blind commitment to an article of unsupported dogma? Sense
was supposed to give an answer to the problem of normative guid-
ance, the problem of specifying how we can access inference-guiding
reasons. And unless there is some connection between the content of
the expressed senses and our grasp thereof, mathematical reasoning
cannot be deemed to be rationally grounded. Accordingly, I think
that the complaint, while strictly speaking correct, can be dismissed.
With this wrinkle out of the way, it thus seems tome that neither an
appeal to the richer notion of sense provided by implicit conceptions,
nor to the only Frege-admissible weakening of g-stability would
succeed in making available a satisfactory escape from the tension.
Implicit conceptions, however, had one promising feature, namely,
they seemed to provide a useful theoretical gloss on Frege’s (1914b,
239) remarks concerning Weierstrass’s confused grasp of number:
He had an inkling of what number is, but it was a very unclear
one; and drawing on that inkling he improved and completed
what should have instead followed from his definitions.
In the next section I wrap things up by considering another way of
glossing what Frege may have meant by inkling (Ahnung) here. It is a
way that is revealed by looking at what Frege says regarding how we
can define concepts. And it allows us tomove away fromwhat I think
is the key problem faced by all the suggestions I considered in this
section, namely, that while we have a fairly clear purchase on the idea
of object-tracking (i.e. keeping track of objects whose properties may
be opaque to us) it instead seems extremely hard to make stable the
idea of concept-tracking (i.e. keeping track of conceptswhose defining
marks may be opaque to us).
4 Saving stability?
How, then, dowe define concepts? Frege (1893/2013, xiv) tells us that
a concept is defined “by stating what property an object must have in
order to fall under it”. There is, thus, no direct way to talk about a
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concept. We always need to go via the detour of talking about prop-
erties of objects, and thereby giving what Frege calls the characteristic
marks of the concept.59 In the case of the concept number, for exam-
ple, we say what it is by saying what numbers are, what essential prop-
erties they have. That’s howwe give the reference of the concept-word
‘number()’. The reference itself is a function that is “sensitive”—just
as we, qua appropriately primed rational thinkers, must be—to the
properties as given by the definition (the conception). It is a func-
tion that maps numbers to the True and everything else to the False.
And how do we give the sense of that concept-word, then, how do we
spell out our conception of the concept? That is, how is that function
given to us? Well, again, in the same way in which we have specified
the concept: by listing the properties objects have to satisfy so as to
be mapped to the True. So, the sense, the conception, is nothing but
the definition of the concept in the sense above (it is the structured
list of the relevant properties: no more, no less).
With that in mind, we could now try to see whether there is a ver-
sion of stability available to the Fregean formulated solely in terms
of what I want to call subsumption-stability (sub-stability) that
might ensure that logicism remains, to some extent at least, a subject-
preserving enterprise. What remains stable is neither the conceptions
nor the concepts, but rather the objects subsumed under varying con-
cepts.60 The idea behind sub-stability, that is, is that pre-logicist
thinkers got hold of the right objects under the wrong guise, that they
were thinking of them all right but by means of the wrong concepts.
Those thinkers were wrong about which properties to predicate of
those objects, and hence they thereby determined the wrong concept
via the wrong conception. Or rather, the conception of that concept
59Frege (1884/1987, §53; 1980, 93; 1997, 190; 1892c, 179; 1893/2013, xiv). At the time of Begriff-
sschrift, Frege also distinguished a different type of concept formation: rather than via definition,
some concepts are attained via extraction from the content of a judgement (1880/1881a, 33–35)—
see Sullivan (2004, §3.3.4) for discussion. I concentrate on the procedure given in Grundgesetze
for a number of reasons. First, it represents Frege’s actual practice in his mature work (concept-
extraction is a form of implicit definition, that is, rather than his preferred method of giving ex-
plicit definitions for the fundamental notions). Secondly, although some concepts and properties
may best be attained via concept-extraction, the concept and properties thus generated can then
enter into an explicit definition as analysans of pre-existing concepts. Thirdly, even in the case of
concept-extraction we start from a judgement that is about objects characterised as falling under
the concept (or concepts subsumed under the so extracted concept).
60Yes, I am now espousing what earlier on (fn. 50) I treated as an unacceptably radical approach
to the problem. The difference is that one is now insisting on the stability of the target objects.
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(the defective one) was correct, as far as it went, but as a conception
of the concept that supposedly characterises the target objects it was
the wrong conception since it left out essential properties of those ob-
jects. Accordingly, if different thinkers attribute different properties
to numbers then both their respective conceptions and conceptsmust
diverge.61
Given Frege’s realism, what can instead plausibly be said to re-
main stable is the objects being talked about, the numbers themselves.
And these are the objects subsumed under the different concepts em-
ployed by different thinkers.62 The commonality of subject-matter is
thus preserved, but at the level of object-reference, as it were, not of
sense or of concept-reference. In fact, what differs is precisely the
conceptual filter through which those objects are apprehended.63 But
still, speakers with a different conceptual repertoire can nevertheless
be said to share a common domain of discourse, although they may
use different words (and languages) to talk about it—the incapacitat-
ing plunge into intellectual confusion that so worried Frege is thus
prevented.
One useful way of putting the contrast between pre-logicist (in-
complete) understanding and logicist (complete) understanding is
to say that while e.g. Weierstrass was right about the computational
properties of numbers, he was missing out the justificatory proper-
ties of number (the properties which determine under what condi-
tions thoughts about numbers are justified). Weierstrass had a sound
inkling, as Frege said, of what numbers were (without question, he
61One might dig one’s Fregean heels and insist that Weierstrass’s inkling was directed at the
concept-as-function that Frege was to make precise. But how can attributing to numbers the prop-
erty of being made up of trains and books (as Frege (1914a, 217–218) claims would follow from
Weierstrass’s definition) be taken to show that Weierstrass had the same concept as Frege in his in-
tellectual crosshair? How can one be so wrong in one’s conception of the concept that one is allegedly
tracking?
62For the case of function and its cognates the account needs a slight modification. It’s not the
objects subsumed under the first-order concept, but the concepts that fall within other higher-level
concepts. See e.g. Frege (1892a, 190; 1914a, 213). Themodified account would, I think, be parasitic
on the one given for first-level concepts.
63As Burge (1993, 296) would say, the speakers had “other epistemic hooks on the entities” to
keep them on the right track despite the wrong explications they gave themselves. Note also that
the move to an object-based conception of normative guidance would tally with Frege (1892b, 158)
remark that “comprehensive knowledge of the reference would require us to be able to say immedi-
ately whether any given sense belongs to it” (my emphases). In other words, and as Kripke (2001)
has argued, there is a backward road from reference to sense, and I think that road is actually what
can give us a true grip on normative constraints.
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was thinking about them), but still in an inchoate state. In fact, we
could say that he was unable to articulate (or indeed apprehend) the
justificatory properties because of an uncertain grasp of the repre-
sentational properties of the concept number (an uncertain grasp of
what numbers really are, of what having representationally correct
thoughts about themwould involve). Nevertheless he had some grasp
of these latter properties, enough to allow him to fix reference cor-
rectly for any occurrence of ‘number’ as a noun-word, but, crucially,
not as a concept-word.
By contrast, logicism enables full grasp of justificatory properties by
making available all (ormore) representational properties, by disclos-
ing the real nature of numbers, by revealing what they are and how
they are given to us: they are logical objects apprehended through a
logical source of cognition. It was this that Weierstrass had missed
and it is this, and this alone, that can finally and appropriately com-
plete our understanding.64 And the missing element that was un-
available toWeierstrass, Frege (1914a, 221, 242) tells us, was the con-
struction of a system. In the absence of a system of proof where all
assumptions, axioms and rules of inference are clearly laid out, there
was no way to test one’s “logical convictions” (1893/2013, xxvi), no
way to “bring to light any flaw in concept formation” (1880/1881a,
35); there was no way, that is, of vindicating one’s mathematical
claims as fully justified in the light of the normative guidance made
available and exemplified by the system.65
The rational intelligibility of the practice is then preserved to the ex-
tent (but nomore than to that extent) that the various conceptions de-
termining various concepts all pick out the same objects as subsumed
under those concepts. What the proofs to be found in Weierstrass’
and Frege’s efforts show is that only numbers can satisfy what both
Frege and Weierstrass establish about them in their different ways.66
64I think that there is a natural way of explaining the significance of the absence of justificatory
properties in pre-logicist thinking along externalist lines. On that proposal we view the content of
the fundamental notions as being partly about the system to be developed in the appropriate Be-
griffsschrift, as partly determined by the structural properties of that system. So construed, then,
mathematical content is anti-individualist in the desired manner (thinker-opaque and partly deter-
mined by external factors). I develop this proposal in an unpublished manuscript still in progress.
65As should be clear, under the current proposal, that guidance is channeled through the provi-
sion of a system but is in the first instance provided by the objects themselves, not by the received
senses of the fundamental notions.
66This is assuming categoricity, which Frege’s system does satisfy. Note that sub-stability is
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And so, on the suggestion that we are exploring, we should say that
properly speaking the normative guidance is provided by the objects
themselves, by the demand that one be faithful to their properties,
as one progressively uncovers them. In short, we are normatively
bound by objects, not concepts. It’s objects that keep us honest, even
though we may be using different concepts to keep track of those ob-
jects across different temporal stages of the practice.67
In this respect, it was Leibniz who was on the right track. As he
tells us in Discourse on Metaphysics, §24, confused understanding is
the ability to single out the correct objects “without being able to say
what [their] properties consist in”. The transition to mature under-
standing occurs when one “can explain the evidence [one] is using” in
so singling out the correct objects, when one is in a position to supple-
ment representational properties with justificatory ones.68 Or equiv-
alently: when one is able to see the (adequately framed) representa-
tional properties as justificatory ones.69 To begin with, however, our
not extension-stability. extension-stability would be another way to go. Neither senses, nor
concepts are stable, all that is required is that extensions be stable. And one might insist that for
Frege the concepts would then be the same. But that is precisely what Frege (1895, 122) denies that
one can say: “sameness” has no applicability to concepts. The most we can say, according to Frege
is that two concept-words are co-referential if their two extensions coincide, but even this is very
heavily hedged indeed (it is all right to say so under a very peculiar understanding of ‘refer’, Frege
tells us). At any rate, what is important in terms of normative guidance is that it be the objects that
guide our reasoning, and not the mistaken concept adopted (even if co-extensional with the correct
one). With sub-stability we get something like sameness of concepts from below, as it were; we
get there because of stability at the level of the objects, that is. And hence, I think sub-stability is
not c-stability—certainly it isn’t if we take the latter thesis in an intensional sense (see e.g. Frege
1895, 118).
67It hardly needs saying that this is mere hand-waving. One way tomake it less suggestive would
be to say that throughout mathematical history we compare attributions of different ranges of prop-
erties to objects andwe verify which properties fit the objects best. This is the sense in which objects
are the only stable element in conceptual history. I doubt we can say anything much more precise
than this.
68This, I think, is the correct way of spelling out Leibniz’s notion of grasp of a clear but confused
idea or rather of an idea that is known clearly but confusedly. There is no doubt as to which idea it
is, but there is a doubt about the sort of idea that it is. Within a Fregean framework, however, the
notion of a clear but confused sense/concept is, if I am right, wholly incoherent. More generally, I
believe that any theory of concepts faces a problem about making sense of conceptual opacity that
one doesn’t face when trying to make sense of objectual opacity in the sense discussed in the text.
69A further historical analogy could be with Kant’s contrast, drawn in the Critique of Judge-
ment, between determinative (i.e. subsumptive) judgement and reflective judgement, judgement
that goes in search of a universal starting from a particular. Determinative judgements are thus
concept-based, while reflective ones are object-based. What I’m sketching in the text is, in effect, a
reflective epistemology of the basic notions of arithmetic. We start with the objects and eventually
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recognitional capacities with respect to those objects are rudimen-
tary, defective, but still aimed at those objects, and they are defective
precisely because, as Gödel (1951, 321) suggested, our knowledge of
what I want to call the deeply analytic content of the fundamental no-
tions of arithmetic “may be as limited and incomplete as that of the
world of things”.
Now, the question that inevitably will arise at this point is: how can
sub-stability be made to cohere with the passages from Frege that I
discussed at the end of §1, the passages where, as I insisted then, Frege
claimed that it was senses that had to remain stable as a condition for
the rational intelligibility of mathematical practice, that any weaker
form of stability would not have sufficed for that purpose? Haven’t
we simply given up on that demand? Haven’t we not so much solved
the tension as dodged it altogether by throwing away any sufficiently
robust version of stability? And the answer is, yes, I’m afraid that
we have. However, if the considerations I brought to bear in §3 are as
decisive as I think they are then sub-stability is really the best we
can hope for on behalf of Frege. We have to admit, that is, that con-
cepts do change across history not just in the empirical domain but
in the mathematical domain too. But that doesn’t have to condemn
our practice to outright incoherence. Perhaps we should conclude
that this is just one more respect in which our practice can merely
approximate the stringent requirements of logic, no doubt much to
the further despair of Frege.70
Still, despite these concessions (or maybe because of them) one
might want to raise the complaint that e.g. sub-stability gives rise
to further, insurmountable problems. For instance, how can sub-
stability account for empty concepts, concepts under which no ob-
jects fall? How do we track those object-less concepts, since all that
we have are the (unsatisfiable) specifications contained in our defini-
tions?71 The worry here, clearly, is that sub-stability lacks full gen-
erality, that it is a purely ad hoc answer, an awkwardly implemented
patch that would lack justification in other cases.
find the concepts. I’m only too aware that this would reverse Frege oft-repeated dictum that we
generate objects from concepts, but I think that a commitment to a concept-based epistemology is
incompatible with any form of stability.
70Tarski (1935, 267; 1944, 347) reached the same conclusion with respect to the concept of truth.
71I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection and for expressing more gen-
eral doubts regarding sub-stability.
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The appropriate response to this objection, I think, is to appeal to
what Frege says in Grundlagen §74: we know of any object that it
doesn’t fall under any empty concept. So sub-stability is in fact
vacuously satisfied by every object with respect to empty concepts. To
track any object is to know, of that object, that it doesn’t fall under any
empty concept. Concept-tracking is based on object-tracking even in
the case of empty concepts, that is. I think the answer is technically
sound but I grant that it is unlikely to pacify the objector who found
sub-stability ad hoc in the first place.
Another complaint could be that all that sub-stability provides is
a different way of drawing the familiar distinction between concept-
possession and concept-mastery, and hence a different way of ex-
plaining the transition between incomplete and complete under-
standing. With sub-stability on hand, that is, one could just say that
to (merely) possess a concept is to have a clear idea as to the objects
that fall under it, while having only an indistinct idea as to why they
so fall.72 Tomaster a concept is instead to have knowledge (either ex-
plicit or inexplicit) of its internal articulation, or as Frege would put,
of its organic composition, and thereby knowwhy certain objects, and
no others, fall under it. If this account could somehowbemade stable,
we would then have a means of arguing for stability sans phrase af-
ter all—sub-stability would just be an epistemic stepping stone to-
wards establishing that the concepts themselves have remained stable.
I have however argued that if I am right about sense-individuation,
any unclaritywith regard to thewhy-properties of a conceptwill entail
that one is in fact grasping a different concept. I therefore think that
the attempt to save stability via sub-stability fails too. Nonethe-
less, I would also insist that reflection on sub-stability brings out
important features of our apprehension of abstract objects and con-
cepts.
72Of course, strictly speaking I must deny that here ‘it’ refers back to the same concept! To those
familiar with the social externalist picture, it will be obvious that I also have to deny that Putnam
possesses the concept beech. My view is that Putnam is linguistically competent with that concept,
in the sense of knowing certain true propositions involving the concept, while not possessing the
concept itself.
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Conclusion
To summatters up: I have argued that by Frege’s own lights there can
be no such thing as misty grasp (or partial understanding) of senses
and concepts because both types of (unsaturated) entities (concep-
tions and functions) are individuated solely in terms of the conceptual
material that constitutes them. Any mistake regarding the individu-
ating marks of an entity of that kind will entail getting hold of some-
thing else instead (or of nothing at all, or at least not of an entity of
that specific, and austere, kind). By contrast, there is no difficulty in
the idea that we may succeed in thinking of objects of a certain kind
even when we do so in a tentative manner; in the case of objects, that
is, being mistaken about some of their properties won’t impair our
capacity to think about them.
From a Fregean perspective, then, the phenomenon of incomplete
understanding cannot be explained in terms of the stable targeting of
senses and concepts because the individuation conditions for those
entities do not admit of degrees of understanding.
Accordingly, it seems to follow that the rationality of mathemati-
cal progress cannot be traced back to (un)reflective observance of the
normative dictates encoded in senses, for such senses could not re-
main stable under variations in the degree of understanding attained
by thinkers (since any such variation, assuming that it could occur,
would affect the content of those senses).
What can plausibly be said to remain stable is the objects we talk
about. We are right about which objects populate the mathematical
domain, but we are wrong, in our pre-logicist state, about their jus-
tificatory properties, the properties that can ground our statements
about those objects. We use senses and concepts that are defective
in terms of fully capturing those properties but adequate for fixing
reference for the singular terms involved.
I also argued that sub-stability is not as problematic as g-
stability because the notion of object-tracking is not as problem-
atic as that of concept-tracking. This is so because a deictic model of
sorts is available even for the case of abstract objects (we can hook
onto them through their behaviour in proof and computation). By
contrast, no model involving deixis of any kind can coherently be ap-
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plied to Fregean senses and concepts.73
I have granted that there are ample reasons to be dissatisfied with
sub-stability however. Above all, although we would be preserv-
ing one aspect that is very dear to Frege, namely, his commitment
to a realist conception of mathematical objects, it is unquestionable
that by adopting sub-stability we would also be jettisoning away
much that was of value to Frege’s highly distinctive epistemology of
logic, in particular his insistence on the central epistemological role
of concepts.
More awkwardly still, if stability with respect to sense is rejected,
it then becomes wholly unclear what the proper role of sense is within
Frege’s framework. If senses cannot provide normative guidance, that
is, what is the point of their introduction? Also, if senses cannot pro-
vide normative guidance, what does? Without relying on senses, what
can guide the transition from partial to full understanding? There is
nothing, at least nothing concept-like, that can rationally guide that
transition, nothing that can provide accessible reasons to justify our
inferential moves. All that we have is objects. But objects, at least
within a Fregean framework, are always given to us as falling under
some concept or other and hence are always mediated by some sense
or other. And yet senses cannot remain stable across mathematical
progress. We seem stuck in a circle.
Unfortunately, I have no answer to offer. Fregean senses, as far as
I can tell, cannot be the repositories of normativity. They can do no
more than exhibit post facto the normative strictures that are con-
strained by the objects themselves and that we progressively uncover
as we refine the logico-mathematical system that we employ to study
mathematical structures. Unless we can make sense of the notion of
tracking abstract objects without the direct deployment of concepts,
then, the problem of normative guidance is here to stay.
I started by quoting the introduction to Grundlagen. Let me close
by returning to that passage. The misty understanding predicament
73It is rather intriguing that in the first mist passage, the one in the introduction to Grundlagen,
Frege compares the case of the bumbling mathematician to that of Columbus catching the first
“dubious glimpse” of what he mistakenly thought was India. The idea that we can similarly be
mistaken about which concept we got hold of but that we nonetheless could already be tracking the
correct one is precisely what I am resisting in this paper. The model of object-tracking does not
transfer seamlessly to that of concept-tracking, at least with respect to a priori concepts. It is thus a
mistake to think that the model of incomplete understanding that Putnam and Burge have argued
for with respect to empirical concepts can seamlessly transfer to the logico-mathematical domain.
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that Frege sketched there was said to arise as we approach the sources
of the concepts under scrutiny. Those sources can be nothing other
than the logical objects that are epistemically accessible to us as the
objects they are only through reflection on properly structured con-
cepts. And the proper articulation of those concepts is, to paraphrase
the foreword to Grundgesetze, one more test of our logical convic-
tions. That is to say, the proper articulation of the fundamental no-
tions of arithmetic provides the proper articulation of our conception
of the logical objects themselves. But until we have articulated the
concepts clearly and distinctly all that we have is an uncertain grasp
of the objects. Properly speaking, there is no grasping the correct con-
cept until our grasp of the objects is itself fully firmed up. And on the
way to the sources, to that proper grasp, we have no other stable help
than what the objects themselves can provide.
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